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STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
Pursuant to the Utah Constitution article VIII, section 4, "The Supreme Court by
rule shall govern the practice of law, including admission to practice law and the conduct
and discipline of persons admitted to practice law," the Utah Supreme Court has
jurisdiction to hear this appeal. Also Utah Code section 78-2-2(3)(c), states that the
Court has appellate jurisdiction over discipline of lawyers.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Issue 1: Whether reciprocal proceedings for discipline pursuant to Rule 22,
Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability (RLDD), permit any regulatory body to
impose greater sanctions than equivalent discipline. The language of Rule 22 puts the
burden on the lawyer to show the court that an exception to equivalent discipline can be
considered. There is no express language in the rule allowing the OPC to seek greater
than equivalent discipline. In Utah, no lawyer has ever been sanctioned more severely by
a regulatory body in a reciprocal discipline matter than what was imposed in the original
jurisdiction.
Issue 2: Whether a body that regulates lawyers can impose sanctions greater than
what was imposed in an out-of-state proceeding when notice and due process provisions
are absent. Some other jurisdictions have increased the penalty that lawyers received in
an out-of-state jurisdiction when their rules had notice and due process provisions
protecting the rights of the lawyer. Should a regulatory body in Utah be able to increase
the lawyer's penalty in a reciprocal proceeding when the rules of notice and due process
provisions are absent.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES AND
REGULATIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE OF THE
APPEAL OR OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL
Rule 22. Reciprocal discipline. Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability.
(a) Duty to notify OPC counsel of discipline. Upon being publicly disciplined by
another court, another jurisdiction, or a regulatory body having disciplinary jurisdiction, a
lawyer admitted to practice in this state shall within thirty (30) days inform the OPC of
the discipline. Upon notification from any source that a lawyer within the jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court has been having disciplinary jurisdiction, OPC counsel shall obtain a
certified copy of the disciplinary order.
(b) Notice served upon lawyer. Upon receipt of a certified copy of an order
demonstrating that a lawyer admitted to practice in this state has been publicly
disciplined by another court, another jurisdiction, of a regulatory body having
disciplinary jurisdiction, OPC counsel shall forthwith issue a notice directed to the lawyer
containing:
(b)(1) a copy of the order from the other court, jurisdiction or regulatory
body:and
(b)(2) a notice giving the lawyer the right to inform OPC counsel, within
thirty (30) days from service of the notice, of any claim by the lawyer predicated
upon the grounds set forth in paragraph (d), that the imposition of the equivalent
discipline in this state would be unwarranted, and stating the reasons for that
claim.
(c) Effect of stay of discipline in other jurisdiction. In the event the discipline
imposed in the other court, jurisdiction or regulatory body has been stayed, any reciprocal
discipline imposed in this state shall be deferred until the stay expires.
(d) Discipline to be imposed. Upon the expiration of thirty (30) days from
service of the notice pursuant to paragraph (b), the district court shall take such action as
may be appropriate to cause the equivalent discipline to be imposed in this jurisdiction,
unless it clearly appears upon the face of the record from which the discipline is
predicated that:
(d)(1) the procedure was so lacking in notice or opportunity to be heard as
to constitute a deprivation of due process;
(d)(2) the imposition of equivalent discipline would result in grave
injustice; or
(d)(3) the misconduct warrants substantially different discipline in this
state or is not misconduct in this jurisdiction.
If the district court determines that any of these elements exist, it shall enter such
other order as it deems appropriate. The burden is on the respondent to demonstrate that
the imposition of equivalent discipline is not appropriate.
(e) Conclusiveness of adjudication in other jurisdictions. Except as provided in
paragraphs (c) and (d) above, a final adjudication of the other court, jurisdiction or
regulatory body that a respondent has been guilty of misconduct shall establish
conclusively the misconduct for purposes of disciplinary proceeding in this state.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case: This is an attorney discipline matter.
Course of the Proceedings: On January 4, 2002, the Supreme Court of
California entered an order suspending the appellee from the practice of law for a period
of three years. Suspension was stayed on the grounds of a probation period of four years
with an actual suspension of eighteen months. The Court ordered conditions of probation
to include the taking and passing of the Multistate Professional Responsibility
Examination during the suspension period. The OPC filed a petition for reciprocal
discipline in the Third District Court on September 16, 2002.
Disposition in the District Court: On April 22, 2003, the Third District Court
entered an order of equivalent discipline stating the same penalties as stated in the
California court (Transcript, R. 104). Actual suspension began of March 28, 2003 (the
date of the hearing) to March 28, 2004. The Court allowed a six month credit for the
time appellee's membership in both states was either inactive or suspended. Total actual
suspension was eighteen months. The Multistate Professional Responsibility
Examination also has to be taken and passed along with the other provisions of the
California order.
Statement of the Facts Relevant to the Issues Presented for Review: The facts
as set forth in the District Court's Findings and Conclusions (R. 89) and the facts stated
in respondent's affidavits (R. 50-53 and R. 74-78) were available to the Court to make its
ruling.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
The only authority of the OPC to sanction wrongful conduct of a lawyer that takes
place in another jurisdiction is found in Rule 22 (d) Rules of Lawyer Discipline and
Disability ("RLDD"). Said rule warrants equivalent discipline in Utah unless the lawyer
can show an exception to equivalent discipline. The burden is on the lawyer to show one
of the stated exceptions. The district court has followed the rule and ordered equivalent
discipline in Utah. The OPC is seeking a more severe penalty (disbarment) in Utah
notwithstanding the notice requirements and due process considerations clearly stated in
Rule 22. There has never been a case in Utah wherein the OPC or any of the Utah courts
have imposed a more severe penalty than equivalent discipline in a reciprocal discipline
matter.
ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Correctly Imposed Equivalent Discipline in Utah for the
Acts that Occurred in California
Rule 22(d) RLDD was interpreted by the district court to mean that the court could

order equivalent discipline to that which was ordered by the California Supreme Court.
However, the respondent has a burden show that if something other than equivalent
discipline is appropriate, the penalty could be less harsh (R. 104, page 29 of the
transcript). Rule 22(d) states:
"the district court shall take such action as may be appropriate to cause the
equivalent discipline to be imposed in this jurisdiction, unless it clearly appears
upon the face of the record from which the discipline is predicated that:
(1) the procedure was so lacking in notice or opportunity to be heard as to
constitute a deprivation of due process;
(2) the imposition of equivalent discipline would result in grave injustice; or
(3) the misconduct established warrants substantially different discipline in the
state or is not misconduct in this jurisdiction. If the district court determines that
any of these elements exist, it shall enter such other order as it deems appropriate.

The burden is on the respondent to demonstrate that the imposition of equivalent
discipline is not appropriate."
Since the respondent was unable to show the court any exception under the rule, the
district court ruled that equivalent discipline should be ordered (Transcript, R.104, page
29). Since no Utah case law defines equivalent discipline, a definition is stated in The
American Heritage Dictionary that the meaning of equivalent is "equal, as in value, force,
or meaning. Having similar or identical effects. Being essentially equal, all things
considered." The clearest meaning of equivalent discipline in Utah would be the same
eighteen months of actual suspension imposed in California with the other provisions of
classes and testing. The district ordered an eighteen month suspension with six months
of credit during the time respondent's license was suspended or inactive in both states at
the same time. Rule 22 was properly interpreted by the court.
IL

Imposition of More Severe Discipline From Equivalent Discipline Results
in a Deprivation of Due Process
The safe guards and fair play provisions of Rule 22(d)(1) "the procedure was so

lacking in notice or opportunity to be heard as to constitute a deprivation of due
process," protects the lawyer in other jurisdictions but not in Utah according to the
OPC's position. No lawyer in the State of Utah has ever received a more severe
penalty in Utah than he or she received in another jurisdiction. This is because
the rule does not provide for a more harsh penalty.
Appellant's brief correctly points out that other jurisdictions (not all) allow more
severe sanctions in a reciprocal process than the original jurisdiction. The District of
Columbia imposes reciprocal discipline more frequently than any other jurisdiction.
However, if a more severe penalty than identical discipline is recommended, a

hearing de novo must be allowed for the lawyer to defend himself or herself. Appellant's
brief states that, ("As noted above, Utah's reciprocal discipline rule does not provide this
option," appellant's brief, page 20 footnote 4).
Appellant's brief cites the Colorado procedure for reciprocal discipline. A six
month suspension that was ordered in New Mexico was ruled to be a disbarment in
Colorado. However, the lawyer was given notice pursuant to Colorado rules that the
regulatory body give the respondent notice of any claim that substantially
different discipline was warranted, and with notice, respondent could present additional
evidence. Utah has no such provision.
It is not unusual and in fact quite common that a stipulation of the facts to resolve
any legal matter to summarily resolve litigation will conform to the elements of a law,
crime, or rule as much as to the actual facts. Appellee's stipulation of the facts
in California conformed to the charges brought by the California Bar. However, another
set of facts that are somewhat different are contained in the briefs filed by appellee at the
district court hearing (Affidavit of Respondent in Support of Memorandum, R. 50-53
and Affidavit of Respondent in Support of Reply Memorandum, R. 74-78). If the
Utah rule provided either notice of more severe discipline as does Colorado or a de novo
action as does the District of Columbia there would be different set of facts in the record
for this court to review.
The stipulated facts in the record from California does not contain some of the
concerns the court had about the hardship of the client, hardship of the medical
provider, the attorney's emotional or personal problems, whether the wrongful conduct
was intentional or negligent or a showing of how the public could be affected, In re

Babilis, 951 P. 2d 207 (Utah 1997) and In re Ennega, 37P. 3d 1150 (Utah 2003).
CONCLUSION
Rule 22 RLDD is the reciprocal authority to discipline lawyers in Utah who have
been disciplined in other states. The district court correctly ordered equivalent discipline
to be carried out in Utah for conduct in California. It is not the intent of the rule to allow
anything other equivalent discipline or less (the burden to be on the lawyer). If that were
not the case, provisions such as Rule 22 (d)(1) requiring due process safeguards in other
states would also be mandated in Utah to preserve due process proceedings for lawyers
in reciprocal matters.
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